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A Conservative Critique of the
Federal Marriage Amendment
by JOHN CHOON YOO* AND ANNTIM VULCHEV**
Introduction
Can you blame conservatives for proposing the Federal Marriage
Amendment (FMA)'? Having been deprived of their voice on social
issues by the Supreme Court on several occasions, conservatives now
fear that continued judicial activism will soon also foreclose
democratic decision-making on marriage policy. No one should be
surprised that opponents of same-sex marriage have taken a big step
toward ensuring that laws about marriage are made in legislatures
and not in courtrooms. However, the same principles that reject the
judicial imposition of uniform social policies should also lead to a
rejection of the FMA. By nationalizing marriage policy, the FMA
undermines the benefits of federalism, such as decisionmaking by
local governments closer to the people and competition among
jurisdictions offering a diversity of policies.
This essay focuses on the right of states to withhold recognition
of out-of-state same-sex marriages, and whether the FMA is
necessary to achieve that end. Part I of this article describes current
constitutional doctrine regarding the interstate recognition of same-
sex marriages. Part II lays out the conservative case against the
FMA, based on such antecedents as Prohibition and the
nationalization of abortion policy. Part III proposes a better
approach. If an amendment is necessary, its purpose should be to
restore the status quo ante that existed before judges upended the
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law;
Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute.
** J.D. Boalt Hall, 2003.
1. "Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to
require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other
than the union of a man and a woman." S.J. Res. 30, 108'h Cong. (2004).
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social order in Massachusetts.2 An amendment in keeping with our
federal system would be one that preserved the definition of marriage
to each state to decide for itself, just as our constitutional system
permitted for the first two centuries of its existence.
I. Current Law and the Definition of Marriage
The possibility that one state's recognition of same-sex marriages
can redefine the definition of marriage for other states depends on
how courts would answer several questions. Specifically, would the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV3 or the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' force states to
recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages? Would the Full Faith and
Credit Clause5 require the same result? Lastly, what effect, if any,
would the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DoMA)6 have?
The answers to these questions will also inevitably be shaped by
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas.7 An in-
depth analysis of Lawrence and the preceding case of Romer v. Evans8
is outside the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it seems clear from
these decisions that the Court is likely to consider laws that regulate
homosexuality as the product of "animus"9 that further "no legitimate
state interest."10 In neither Lawrence nor Romer did the Court accept
the state's reasons as sufficient to overcome even rational basis
review. It is also unclear from the decisions what legitimate state
interest would justify the differential regulation of homosexuals, and
what type of record the state would need to assemble to show that its
interest is not the mere product of animus.
Obviously, a state may permit same-sex marriage through its own
mechanisms of government, as has happened in Massachusetts.
However, this does not rise to the level of a national question. The
2. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
3. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
4. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
6. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
9. Id. at 632.
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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people of Massachusetts through their legislature have the
opportunity to overrule their high court and amend their constitution,
and the more important concern is not whether same-sex marriages
are performed anywhere, but whether they can be forced upon
unwilling states from without.
Returning to the question of the interstate effects of one state's
recognition of same-sex marriage, it is clear that the Privileges and
Immunities Clauses of the Constitution would not require interstate
recognition of same-sex marriages. Yet, the opposite argument has
been made," and so for that reason the Clauses should be examined
briefly.
First, Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause is not
implicated when a state that prohibits same-sex marriages within its
own borders also refuses to recognize the validity of an out-of-state
same-sex marriage. The out-of-state visitors are not denied anything
that in-state residents already enjoy. According to Professor Tribe,
there has "been little debate" 12 about the approach exemplified by
the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Toomer v. Witsell3 that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause "was designed to insure [sic] to a
citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which
the citizens of State B enjoy.' 4 Article IV, section 2 protects the
rights of out-of-state visitors, but only if those rights are
"fundamental"'5 and already enjoyed by citizens of the state.
11. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-
Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 553 (2000) (arguing that the
Privileges and/or Immunities Clauses force states to recognize out-of-state same-sex
marriages as an inherent part of the right to travel).
12. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6-36, at 1250 (3d ed.
2000). In the early case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (no.
3230), Justice Bushrod Washington attempted to "import the natural rights doctrine into
the Constitution by way of the Privileges and. Immunities Clause of Article IV." Id. at
1252. The rights protected were "fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free government." 6 Fed. Cas. at 552. However, the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873), firmly circumscribed the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The clause
was held not to be a source of rights, and Corfield was read as further limiting the clause,
so in effect states could discriminate between residents and non-residents if the rights in
question were not sufficiently important.
13. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
14. Id. at 395.
15. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. A more recent interpretation of the privileges and
immunities protected by Art. IV is found in Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978)
(Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact
that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted; other
distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the
Winter 2005|
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 6 embraced by the Supreme Court after 130 years of neglect,17
also does not provide a basis for requiring interstate recognition of
same-sex marriages. In Saenz v. Roe, 8 the Court held that because
the right to travel is fundamental, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
also guaranteed that a state's new residents will be treated the same
as more established residents. 9 The Saenz Court was not concerned
merely with a deterrence to travel, but rather "a citizen's right to be
treated equally in her new State of residence."20 But the equality in
question was in regards to benefits that existed entirely within a
state's borders. If the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires a
state that does not allow same-sex marriages to recognize the same-
sex marriage of transplants from, say, Massachusetts, it would mean
that the Clause has created a certain minimum floor of rights in the
family law area. But the Clause has not yet been read to do that. It
protects the rights of citizens qua national citizens, and so far that has
not been read to extend to family law issues.
An analysis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause vis-A-vis
interstate recognition of same-sex marriages is more complicated.
The Supreme Court has held that the Clause "does not require a
State to apply another State's law in violation of its own legitimate
public policy."'" In the context of marriage, Professor Lea Brilmayer
has argued that the Clause has never "been read to require one state
to recognize another state's marriages, 22 and further, that the Clause
and its attending judicial interpretation adequately safeguard a state's
liberty to not recognize same-sex marriages.23  Notwithstanding
development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those
'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single
entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.)
16. U. S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
17. Prior to 1999, the Clause was used by the Supreme Court only once in Colgate v,
Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), to invalidate a state law. That case was overruled shortly
thereafter in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
18. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
19. Id. at 502-05.
20. Id. at 505.
21. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1980). See also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538
U.S. 488, 494 (2003), quoting Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) ("[T]he Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its
own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.').
22. Lea Brilmayer, Full Faith and Credit, WALL ST. J., March 9, 2004 at A16.
23. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage
Laws?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property
[Vol. 32:2
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Professor Brilmayer's argument, a state court has relied on the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to recognize certain marital rights for a same-
sex couple in New York based on their Vermont civil union. 24
Professor Brilmayer's analysis, however, does not adequately
deal with Lawrence and Romer. States generally recognize marriages
granted in other states, subject to a few narrow exceptions. Suppose a
state continues to recognize out-of-state marriages, except for those
between members of the same sex. This would trigger review under
Romer and Lawrence to determine whether the state prohibition is
anything more than the product of animus. The "public policy
exemption," after all, is not absolute,2' and must survive the
requirements of other parts of the Constitution. If, for example, a
state recognized all out-of-state marriages except for those between
members of different races, there seems to be little doubt that such a
law would undergo - and fail - strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
After Romer and Lawrence, it is likely that states may be forced
to accept the legality of out-of-state same-sex marriages due to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. States could not take advantage of the
public policy exception to the Clause because a law discriminating
against out-of-state same-sex marriages would not survive rational
basis review as applied in the two decisions. It is difficult to see how a
Court interested in being consistent could find that Texas' criminal
prohibition on sodomy did not further a legitimate state interest, but
that a bar on out-of-state gay marriage did. Nor is it clear whether
states could satisfy any minimal standard of evidence to show that
such a prohibition was not the product of animus.
Anticipating the possibility that Full Faith and Credit could be
judicially interpreted to require interstate recognition of same-sex
marriages, Congress passed DoMA. The first part of the act limits
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., Mar. 3, 2004 (statement of
Professor Lea Brilmayer) (developing the argument that states have had, and will
continue to have, latitude to reject marriages from sister states).
24. In Langan v. Saint Vincent's Hospital, 196 Misc. 2d 440 (N.Y. Misc., 2003), a New
York court ruled that a decedent's partner, because of the couple's Vermont-sanctioned
civil union, could maintain a survivorship action against a hospital, where, under New
York law, he normally would not be able to do so. The court noted, however, that it could
reach its holding in large part because New York has no public policy on same-sex
marriage or DoMA that would contravene the judgment.
25. See, e.g., Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 499 (The exemption was applied where the Court did
not face a situation "in which a State has exhibited a 'policy of hostility to the public Acts'
of a sister State.").
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
federal benefits of marriage to opposite sex couples. 6  More
importantly, the second part, pursuant to Congress's powers under
Article IV, section 1 to enact laws regarding "the manner in which
[the] Acts, Records and [judicial] Proceedings [of other states] shall
be proved and the Effect thereof,"' confirms state power to refuse
recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages.2 The law has been
criticized as an inappropriate use of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,29 but there is no obvious reason to believe it would be struck
down on these grounds.
DoMA's viability, however, is entirely dependent on how, once
again, the reasoning of Romer and Lawrence is applied. Congress has
used its power to regulate the recognition of out-of-state acts, records
and proceedings to select one type of state action - the granting of
marriages to same-sex couples - for prohibition. It seems this would
be subject to Romer and Lawrence type scrutiny, assuming that the
Court reads the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as it has
read the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.3° To use the
race example again, imagine if Congress had passed a law allowing
states to refuse to recognize interracial marriages. It seems clear that
such a law would be subject to equal protection-style analysis under
the Fifth Amendment, and that it would fail constitutional scrutiny.
To be sure, Lawrence and Romer call for a lower level of scrutiny -
rational basis review - than the strict scrutiny applied in racial
discrimination cases. Nonetheless, it is again difficult to see the
justification that Congress could provide for DoMA that would
surpass that provided by Texas in Lawrence. It is probable that
DoMA would be struck down as a violation of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause.
H. The Conservative Case against the FMA.
While this article is about the wisdom of the FMA and not about
26. 1 U.S.C § 7 (2001).
27. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1..
28. "No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship." 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2001).
29. TRIBE, supra note 10, 6-35 at 1247 n. 49 ("[B]ut this statement cannot plausibly be
construed to empower Congress to prescribe that states may choose to give no effect at all
to an entire category of official state Acts.").
30. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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the wisdom of same-sex marriage, each inquiry informs the other.
More specifically: a) the starting observation that the nation's
significant opposition to same-sex marriage rights3 is a manifestation
of what is best termed "philosophical conservatism," leads to b) the
conclusion that the very principles which animate opposition to same-
sex marriage should also lead to strong doubts about the FMA
Describing the tradition of Edmund Burke, the influential historian
J.G.A. Pocock identified "philosophical conservatism" as "the claim
that human beings acting in politics always start from within a
historically determined context, and that it is morally as well as
practically important to remember that they are not absolutely free to
wipe away this context and reconstruct human society as they wish."33
This is the essence of principled disapproval of the rush towards
same-sex-marriage, and it is this historical sensibility that should give
marriage traditionalists pause in their current attempts to amend the
Constitution.
Consider the history of constitutional amendments in general.
The Framers designed the founding document to be difficult to
amend, likely to be done only in response to strict necessity. Article V
requires that two-thirds of the House and Senate propose the text,
which must then receive the approval of three-quarters of the state
legislatures. (Another process, never used, allows for two-thirds of
the state legislatures to call a constitutional convention). As James
Madison explained in the Federalist No. 43, this process allows for the
correction of errors in the Constitution without allowing it to become
as flexible as an ordinary piece of legislation. "It guards equally
against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too
mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its
31. The current national majority that at this point opposes same-sex marriage
transcends political parties and draws significant supports from democrats, moderates, and
African-Americans. See Genero C. Armas, Delegates, Ticket Differ on Gay Marriage,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 21, 2004 available at
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay-marriage/articles/2004/07/21/democratsseen m
ore-open-to-gay-marriage/ (citing Pew Research Center polls).
32. The philosophical consistency of disapproving both of same-sex marriage and the
FMA is also mirrored by the nation's simultaneous opposition to same-sex marriage and
its hesitancy to embrace the FMA. See Alan Cooperman, Christian Groups Say They
Won't Give Up, WASHINGTON POST, July 15, 2003, at A04 ("'The polls tell us that most
people oppose gay marriage,' said Pew pollster Andrew Kohut. 'They also tell us that the
public is pretty conservative when it comes to fiddling with the old Constitution."').
33. J.G.A. POCOCK, Introduction to EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE vii. (J.G.A. Pocock, ed., Hackett Publishing Co., 1987) (1789-
1799).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
discovered faults."' In addition, wrote Madison, the amendment
process worked a valuable role in maintaining the balance of powers
between the federal and state governments. It "equally enables the
general and the State governments to originate the amendment of
errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or
on the other."35
It should not be surprising that this hurdle has led to relatively
few amendments. Since 1791, when the Bill of Rights added the first
10 amendments to the Constitution, the nation has approved only 17
more over the course of the following 213 years. Many of these
changes have focused on modernizing the workings of our democracy,
such as expanding the electorate to include African-Americans,
women and 18-year-olds, providing for the direct election of senators,
limiting presidents to two terms, and specifying the order of
presidential selection and succession. Almost all of the amendments
have the purpose of either organizing or limiting the powers of the
federal or state governments, such as the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses requirement of equal and fair treatment by the
government. The most notable effort to regulate purely private
conduct - the 18th Amendment's establishment of Prohibition -
failed miserably and led to the rise of organized crime.
Our Republic is a consequence of the Founders' pursuit of
liberty. According to Tocqueville, the "distinguishing characteristics"
of the original republic were "decentralized order" (federalism) and
"mediating institutions,"' and the latter were reinforced by the
former.37  Thus, in turn, federalism was the great guarantor of
liberty 8 The hard choice that opponents of same sex marriage have
to face is that "federalism's survival.. .may depend on the willingness
of citizens to defend the autonomy of their states even when
confronted by national policies that would otherwise be attractive.
31
Here the analogy with Prohibition is instructive. Much like the
current movement behind the FMA, in large part a response to
decades of imposition by federal judges on a multitude of social
34. FEDERALIST No. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
35. Id. at 278-79.
36. See John McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 491 (2002).
37. See id. at 507-11.
38. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,
1357-1404 (1997).
39. McGinnis, supra note 36, at 495.
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issues, the "drys" behind Prohibition were in significant measure
motivated to pursue their goals nationally after the Supreme Court on
occasion stymied their ability to regulate alcohol at the state level. 4
Liquor merchants defeated state regulations by relying on the
Commerce Clause. Prohibitionists eventually prevailed in 1913 with
the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act,42 which prohibited the
importation of liquor into any state with laws against its use. In 1917,
the Supreme Court upheld the act in Clark Distilling Company v.
Western Maryland Railway.43 But not satisfied by their victory with
the Webb-Kenyon Act, prohibitionists succeeded with their demand
that social policy be woven into the Constitution itself.
The irony was that a movement shaped by frustration with
nationally imposed limits on state policy ended up greatly enhancing
the power of the federal government. In addition to burgeoning
federal agencies, the Supreme Court, for example, upheld broad
powers for Congress under the Eighteenth Amendment's enabling
clause, a consequence that would outlive Prohibition by influencing
future constitutional litigation.' Enforcement of Prohibition was
uneven and brutal,45 but also ineffective. 46
A blanket prohibition on same sex marriages would similarly
lead to a multitude of unforeseen circumstances. Many Americans
passionately believe in gay marriage, and their numbers over the long
run might increase. One salient question is: what will be the outlet of
40. See Sidney J. Spaeth, Note, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 171-73
(1991) (giving an overview of state regulation and corresponding Supreme Court
decisions).
41. Id.
42. Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 122
(1982)).
43. 242 U.S. 311 (1914).
44. See David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 Duke
L.J. 65, 118 (1986) ("Most significant for future constitutional litigation, however, were
three decisions of the Taft period giving a broad construction to Congress's [sic] authority
under Section 2 of the [Eighteenth Amendment] 'to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."').
45. See Spaeth, supra note 40, at 161-62, NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER US FROM
EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN PROHIBITION 165 (1976).
46. See MABEL WALKER WILLEBRANDT, THE INSIDE OF PROHIBITION (1929).
Willebrandt, a former U.S. Deputy Attorney General in charge of Prohibition
enforcement, labeled Prohibition a failure, primarily because of the obstructionism of
unwilling local officials. She also condemned the heavy-handed approach of officials who
sought to compensate for local laxity with increasing numbers of federal agents. Id. at
177-179.
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those citizens' passion on the subject? How will the nation cope with
inevitable civil disobedience? Surely we shouldn't lightly approve of
the violation of the Constitution. But then, it is worth asking whether
a constitutional ban on gay marriage will promote the goals its
advocates seek, rather than producing disregard for the law.
The example of Roe v. Wade47 also sheds light on the harms of
nationalization. There is a vast difference in legitimacy between a
binding decision on a contentious social issue by a handful of justices,
and a majoritarian preference sealed by a two-thirds vote in each
chamber of Congress and approved by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the states. However, many of the effects of the FMA
would be the same as those begotten by Roe. Justice Scalia's dissent
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey could be read as an eloquent warning
about the dangers of injuring federalism by nationalizing any social
policy:
Not only did Roe not.., resolve the deeply divisive issue of
abortion; it did more than anything else to nourish it, by
elevating it to the national level where it is infinitely more
difficult to resolve. National politics were not plagued by
abortion protests, national abortion lobbying, or abortion
marches on Congress before Roe v. Wade was decided.
Profound disagreement existed among our citizens over the
issue-as it does over other issues, such as the death penalty-
but that disagreement was being worked out at the state level.
As with many other issues, the division of sentiment within each
State was not as closely balanced as it was among the
population of the Nation as a whole, meaning not only that
more people would be satisfied with the results of state-by-state
resolution, but also that those results would be more stable.
Pre-Roe, moreover, political compromise was possible.48
The mere effort to nationalize marriage could produce the same
long-term negative effects, in which candidates of both parties must
make pledges on gay marriage and the issue dominates our
appointments to the federal courts. Allowing gay marriage to be
decided state-by-state could avoid the political divisiveness produced
by Roe v. Wade and, in fact, lead to a more enduring settlement of the
issue.
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995 (1992).
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I. An Amendment that Protects a Democratic Consensus on
Marriage and Preserves Federalism
If courts applied the reasoning of Lawrence and Romer to strike
down DoMA and state DoMAs, the solution would be a
constitutional amendment that would merely restore power to the
states. Such an amendment might be similar to the second part of
DoMA, 9 its purpose being to ensure each state's right to not
recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. It would thus preserve the
benefits of federalism by allowing states to compete for residents and
businesses by offering different mixes of economic and social policies.
As in a market, citizens can satisfy their preferences by deciding to
live in states that provide the tax, education, welfare or family policies
with which they agree. Some states, such as Massachusetts, might
choose to permit gay marriage, while others such as California might
choose to define marriage as between a man and woman, and
Americans could choose to live in either state depending on what
policy they support.
A pro-federalism amendment also makes sense as a matter of
public policy. Advocates on both sides of this emotional debate are
floating a variety of arguments about the effects of gay marriage.
Supporters claim that it leads to the stability of relationships and
extends the positive benefits of marriage to homosexual couples.
Opponents argue that it undermines the institution of marriage and
could lead to higher divorce and lower marriage rates.
All sides should admit that the sample size for making these
judgments is far too small - there simply are not enough jurisdictions
that have permitted gay marriage. Allowing each of the fifty states to
choose a different policy on gay marriage would provide that diversity
of experience that would allow us to see whether gay marriage indeed
causes negative effects on society or the opposite.
This would truly take advantage of Justice Brandeis' famous
description of the states as "laboratories of democracy."50 As he
observed, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004).
50. The reference is to New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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risk to the rest of the country."51
Conclusion
The Federal Marriage Amendment in the 108th Congress is
dead,52 and some of its supporters couldn't be happier.53 In politics,
tactical defeats are the constituency-motivating precursors of strategic
victories, and traditionalists who oppose gay marriage may in fact be
heading toward a future victory with the FMA (or at least collateral
victories).' But neither the fight nor the prize is worth it. A better
approach should seek to enhance federalism. Conservatives who
have criticized the Supreme Court's nationalization of abortion in
Roe v. Wade should support a more modest amendment that would
prevent one state, such as Massachusetts, from deciding the policy on
same-sex marriage for all other states.
51. Id.
52. The amendment was decisively defeated in the Senate, and while the House could
still pick it up during the 10 8" Congress, the amendment would still need to pass through
the Senate to advance out of Congress.
53. See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Gay Marriage As The "New Abortion", WASHINGTON
POST, July 26, 2004, at A3. ("Until the Senate vote, evangelical leaders bemoaned their
supporters' passivity over the Massachusetts court decision. But several said they believed
the vote energized grass-roots conservatives. 'We lost the vote, but I'm ecstatic,'
[Southern Baptist Convention official, Rev. Richard Land] said.").
54. See also Alan Cooperman, Christian Groups Say They Won't Give Up,
WASHINGTON POST, July 15, 2003, at A4, ("[Prison Fellowship Ministries head Charles
Colson] and other evangelical leaders said the Senate vote achieved several objectives,
including energizing grass-roots conservatives, forcing senators to take a stand and forging
bonds between the Republican Party and socially conservative black churchgoers who
have traditionally been steadfast Democrats.").
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